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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-INTERSTATE

COMMERCE-STATE

REGULATION

OF TRUCKS

SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER ACT

H. P. Welch Co. v. State of New Hampshire,
The state of New Hampshire in 1933 enacted a law 2 declaring it unlawful
for contract or common carriers, with certain specified exceptions, to operate on
the state highways when their drivers have been continuously on duty for twelve
hours or more. Appellant is a Massachusetts corporation doing intrastate and
interstate business, approximately 99 per cent of the business being interstate,
as a common and contract carrier in the state of New Hampshire. The Public
Service Commission of that state in December, 1937, suspended appellant's
registration certificate for five days for violating Section 8 of the New Hampshire
Act 3 in regard to maximum hours of employment of truck drivers. The case
was appealed to the United States Supreme Court from a dismissal of an appeal
from an order of the Public Service Commission by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire.
Appellant contended that 'the Act was unconstitutional because irr direct
conflict with the equal protection clause, and secondly, (to which point this note
is limited) because the Federal Motor Carrier Act 4 and the regulations promulgated-thereuncfer by the Interstate Commerce Commission have superseded the
state's authority to regulate the hours of employment of interstate motor carriers.
Summarily, the Court held that the Congressional authority under the Federal
Motor Carrier Act and the regulations as prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, 5 the effective date of which was postponed until January 31, 1939,

1. 306 U. S. 79 (1939).
2. N. H. Laws 1933, c. 106. Section 1 requires common and contract carriers
between points within the state to register their trucks with the Public Service
Commission. Section 2 states that contract carriers include those, other than
common carriers, who haul for hire by motor vehicle on any road of the state.
Section 3 exempts from the challenged regulation those transporting products of
their own manufacture or labor, and motor vehicles not principally engaged in
the transportation of property for hire or operating exclusively in a city or town
or within ten miles of its limits or beyond the ten-mile limit on not more than two
trips in thirty days. Sect-ion 8 declares: "It shall be unlawful for any driver to
operate, or for the owner thereof to require or permit any driver to operate, any
motor vehicle for the transportation of property for hire on the highways of this
state when the driver has been continuously on duty for more than twelve hours,
and after a driver has been continuously on duty for twelve hours it shall be
unlawful for him or for the owner of the vehicle to permit him to operate any
such motor vehicle on the highways of this state until he shall have had at least
eight consecutive hours off duty." Section 11 provides that for violations of the
Act the commission shall have authority after notice and hearing, to suspend or
revoke any registration certificate.
3. Ibid.
4. 49 STAT. 546 (1936), 49 U. S. C. § 304 (Supp. 1938).
5 Ex parte No. MC-2, 3 M. C. C. 665 (I. C. C. Reports 1937).

(104)
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did not supersede nor divest the state's authority to continue their regulations
of the maximum hours of employment of drivers for interstate motor carriers, at
least, until the effective date of operation of the Interstate Commerce Commission's
regulations. It is worthy to note that the alleged violations of the state Act by
the appellant occurred before the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission concerning the identical subject matter were promulgated.

The Court,

cognizant of this fact, intimated that this difference in time is in no way decisive
of the result reached.

Guided by precedent of analagous cases involving the

same problem, the Court applied a rule of construction of federal statutes that
had been the governing factor in those cases.' The rule applied is that "In construing federal statutes enacted under the power conferred by the commerce
clause of the Constitution

.

.

.

it should never be held that Congress intends

to supersede or suspend the exercise of the reserved powers of a State, even where
that may be done, unless, and except so far as, its purpose to do so is clearly
manifested." 7 Seemingly, the Court's principal reliance is placed on the theory
that there is an extreme necessity to protect human lives and property on the
highways and that the regulation of motor carriers, particularly the hours of
employment of truck drivers, will necessarily tend toward the desired result.
Manifestly, the Court will imply that the Congressional intent must have been
to permit the states to exercise their reserved powers over highway traffic until
effective federal action. The Court emphasizes that the uniform effort of all
governmental authorities, under modern conditions, is to mitigate the destruction
of life, limb and property resulting from the use of motor vehicles. No one will
take issue with the proposition that a tired and overworked truck driver who
is permitted to operate on the highways is a menace to the traveling public.
Congress, in the face of such dangers, would not intend to strip the states of their
authority to act until they had substituted a working measure in its place.
The Court, following this same line of reasoning in Kelly -v. Washington,s said:'
"When the State is seeking to protect a vital interest, we have always been slow
to find that the inaction of Congress has shorn the State of the power which it
would otherwise possess." The protection of human lives and property on the
highways from possible destructive forces would, without doubt, come within this
meaning of vital interests.
Orthodoxly, the Court has consistently held that whenever the federal government took effective action in a field of interstate commerce the state's authority
to regulate that identical subject matter by virtue of its police powers had been
superseded by the federal regulations. 9

This so-called doctrine of the occupancy

6. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346 (1933); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137
(1902); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Larabee Flour Mills, 211 U. S. 612 (1909); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412 (1914) ; Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
282 U. S. 133 (1930); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm.,
297 U. S. 471 (1936).
7. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Public Utilities Comm., 245 U. S. 493, 510 (1918).
8. 302 U. S. I, 14 (1937).
9. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115 (1913); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v.
Hardwick Farmers Elev. Co., 226 U. S. 426 (1913); Pensacola Telegraph Co. v.
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of the field of action by Congress has never been clarified by the Court as to
what Congressional action must be taken before the resultant supersedure of
federal authority over the state's reserved power will occur. Following this
doctrine of occupancy of the field of action by Congress, the Supreme Court in
n
Northern Pacific Ry. r. Washington," and in Erie R. R. v. New York, held that a
state act regulating hours of employment of railway employees engaged in interstate commerce was invalidated by the enactment of the Federal Hours of
Service Act,'2 even though the effective date of the federal regulations was postponed for a year, and, therefore, the state act in no way conflicted with the
operation of the federal statute. Upon a cursory examination, these cases seem to
decide the very issue involved in the instant case. However, the Court disposed
of their precedential force by concluding that the facts were so variant as to
require no discussion. To dispose of any binding effect that these above-mentioned
railroad cases might have upon the instant case, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, 13 from which this appeal is taken, pointed out that in the railroad
cases Congress had made the regulations and had postponed their effective date,
whereas in the principal case, Congress passed a general law imposing the duty
of formulating the rules thereunder upon the Interstate Commerce Commission,
who, after making such regulations, postponed their effective date. This purported
grounds for distinguishing these cases has never been followed by the United
States Supreme Court, and it made io mention of it in the principal case. However, a purported distinction of these cases may be made with some plausibility on
the basis that the regulations in the principal case affected matters inherently
different in their nature and characteristics than those in the railroad cases.
The occupation of railroad engineers is highly technical and complex in its nature,
and can only be mastered after long training and experience. The commonplace
occupation of truck driving requires no special training and permits the motor
carriers to select their drivers at random. If motor carriers were required to make
drastic changes in their schedules and the personnel of their employment, they
would find little difficulty in making rapid adjustments to the new conditions.
When railroads are required to make such changes, however, they must necessarily
be given adequate time to adjust themselves to the future conditions to be imposed
upon them. The Supreme Court pointed out in Erie R. R. v. New York, that
Congress had recognized this fact by postponing the effective date of the act
to enable the railroads to meet the new conditions. State action regulating lie
hours of employment in the railroad cases would have thwarted the Congressional
purpose, whereas in the instant case the same justification for precluding state
regulation of motor carriers does not exist.

Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1877); Powell, Current Conflicts
Between the Commerce Clause and State Police Power (1928) 12 MINN. L. REV.
607; Note, Supersedure of State Laws by Federal Regulations under the Commerce Clause (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 532.
10. 222 U. S.370 (1912).
11. 233 U. S.671 (1914).
12. 34 STAT. 1415 (1907), 45 U. S. C. § 61 (1934).
13. H. P. Welch Co. v. State of New Hampshire, 89 N. H. 428, 199 AtI. 886
(1938).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1940], Art. 11

3940]j

RECENT CASES

The Court recognized the state's proprietary interest in their highways.
Whether this proprietary interest in itself is sufficient to justify state regulation
of interstate motor carriers operating on state highways in the face of inoperative federal regulations is open to speculation, as the Court did not ground its
decision on that principle. Obviously there would be a greater justification for
permitting the states in such a situation to protect their vital interests on the
highways than on the privately owned railroad beds.
In the case of Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nay. Co. v. Washington,14 a statute
of Washington authorized the establishment of quarantines against infected plants
and trees by the director of agriculture, who, by virtue of such authority, proclaimed quarantines and forbade the importation of alfalfa to prevent the introduction of the alfalfa weevil into the state.

A Congressional act delegated to

the federal department of agriculture the exclusive care of horticulture and
agriculture of the states as affected injuriously by transportation in interstate
and foreign commerce. The federal department of agriculture had taken no
steps toward the prevention of the spread of alfalfa weevil by transportation in
interstate commerce. The Court held that Congress had occupied the field by the
passage of the act and that the state's power to regulate that same field of action
had been superseded by the federal authority, even though there was no conflict
in the operation of the federal and state statutes.1 5 However, since the holding
in this case there has been some speculation by writers that the Court will be more
hesitant to assume a strict construction in the application of the doctrine of the
occupancy of the field of action than they had in the past. The principal case
is some evidence of that speculation turning into a reality.
No sound reason can be given for the rule that where the effectiveness of
Congressional legislation has been postponed in a field of action affecting the vital
interests of the state, the state's reserved power to act has been precluded when
state regulations in no way conflict, hinder, embarrass, or obstruct federal
authority. Recent authority has shown that supersedure of state authority should
occur where there is effective federal action, but not until that point has been
reached.16
SIMON POLSKY

14. 270 U. S. 87 (1926).
15. In a dissent by Justice _1IcReynolds, concurred in by JuFtice Sutherland,
he condemned this deplorable situation of rendering the state helpless by asseverating: "It is a serious thing to paralyze the efforts of a state to protect her
people against impending calamity and leave them to the slow charity of a far-off
and perhaps supine federal bureau."
16. Eichholz v. Public Serv. Comm., 59 Sup. Ct. 532 (1919)
In this case the
Missouri Public Service Commission revoked an interstate motor carrier's permit
to operate on the state highway for violations of the state act regulating motor
carriers. On the passage of the Federal Motor Carrier Act the carrier applied
to the Interstate Commerce Commission for a permit to operate, which application
was still pending at the time of this suit. The carrier, in this suit, was seeking
to enjoin the Public Service Commisson of Missouri from revoking his permit,
and he contended, among other things, that the federal authority to regulate
interstate motor carriers had superseded the state's power to regulate such carriers by virtue of the passage of the Federal Motor Carrier Act. The Court
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CRIMINAL LAW-AIDING AND ABETTING-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

State v. Mathis,
Defendant and a companion went into a department store wherein the
companion stole certain goods. The state attempted to prove that defendant
aided and abetted her by standing by, watching while she committed the offense.
On a charge of petit larceny, the companion pleaded guilty, and defendant
was tried and convicted by the court. On appeal, the St. Louis Court of Appeals
found there was no substantial proof of guilt and reversed the conviction.
At common law, parties to a felony were classified as principals or accessories, 2 principals being those actually or constructively present at the fact.3
A principal was of the first degree-that is, he who committed the crime; or
of the second degree-that is, he who took no part in the actual commission of
the offense, but was present aiding and abetting him who did.' This classification
has been abolished by statute in Missouri,5 and in many other states.r However,
even under such statutes, when it is sought to prove that the accused did not
directly perpetrate the crime, but only aided and abetted its perpetration, seemingly it would be necessary to find him guilty of that which formerly would
have made him a principal in the second degree. It is not improper to accuse
one of aiding and abetting a misdemeanor, 7 although at common law no distinction was made between principals in the first and second degree in misdemeanors. s
To aid and abet the commission of a crime is to assist or encourage the
t0
Mere presence at the
actual perpetrator." There must be some participation.

disposed of-the carrier's contention, relying principally on the instant case, by
asserting that due to the failure of the Interstate Commerce Commission to act
upon the carrier's application, the state's authority to take appropriate action
to enforce reasonable regulations of traffic upon the state highways had not
been superseded. There are two recent state decisions which hold in accord with
the principal case. Lowe v. Stoutamire, 123 Fla. 135, 166 So. 310 (1936) ; State
ex rel. R. C. Motor Lines v. Florida R. R. Comm., 123 Fla. 345, 166 So. 840 (1936).
1. 129 S.W. (2d) 20 (Mo. App. 1939).
2. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW (1934) 226.
3. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (1933) 1416; MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW (1934)
229; Note (1923) 22 MICH. L. REV. 165.
4. State v. Davis, 29 Mo. 391, 396 (1860).
5. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 4446: "Every person who shall be a prin,.inal
in the second degree in the commission of any felony, or who shall be an accessbory
to any murder or other felony before the fact, shall, upon conviction, be adjudged
guilty of the offense in the same degree, and may be charged, tried, convicted
and punished in the same manner, as the principal in the first degree."
6. Note (1931) 25 ILL. L. REy. 845 (collection of such statutes).
7. United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460 (U. S. 1827); Shannon v.
People. 5 Mich. 71 (1858); People v. Hoaglin, 262 Mich. 162, 247 N. W. 141
(1933).
8. Dowdy v. State, 44 Ga. App. 569, 162 S. E. 155 (1932); State v. Woodworth. 121 N. J. L. 78, 1 A. (2d) 254 (1938).
9. Johnson v. State, 21 Ala. App. 565, 110 So. 55 (1926) (assist, encourage,
support) ; State v. Maloy, 44 Iowa 104 (1876) (assent, countenance, anprove,
advise, encourage); State v. Larkin, 250 Mo. 218, 157 S. W. 600 (1913) (aid,
abet. assist, encourage, advise) ; State v. Baldwin, 193 N. C. 566, 137 S. E. 590
(1927) (incite, encourage, abet, aid, advise, assist).
10. Turner v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 311, 104 S. W. (2d) 1085 (1937).
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scene of a crime will not constitute one a participator therein.I Nor is it sufficient
14
3
that one is present mentally approving,- or consenting to,1 or even favoring
the commission of the crime, if such approval, consent, or favor is not made
known to the actual perpetrator.
Many cases unreservedly state that there must be some affirmative word,
act, or deed by the accused, before he can be convicted of participating in the
crime,-, for a mere unlawful purpose or intent without an act in furtherance of
that purpose or intent is not an offense.'

However, such affirmative conduct

seems to be required only when the parties are not acting by a community of
unlawful purpose.1
Apparently, no court has, expressly, made this distinction,
but two cases illustrate it.
rape a ten year old girl.

In People v. Woodward,18 several boys attempted to
It was alleged that defendant stood by and aided and

encouraged them in the accomplishment of their purpose. There was no evidence
of preconcert or combination between defendant and the others. The court found
defendant was not guilty from the mere fact that he was present, if he did no
9
act to aid, assist, or abet the perpetration of the crime. In People v. Chapman,1
defendant hired R. to seduce his (defendant's) wife so that he could obtain a
divorce. The wife not yielding to R's advances, he raped her. Defendant was
watching all the while through a hole in the wall, making no effort to restrain
R. The court found defendant guilty of rape, saying, "The husband was not a
mere passive looker-on ........
when the wife screamed, and respondent did
not interfere, he (R) knew that the husband was willing he should succeed in
the accomplishment of the intercourse by force, . . . And the presence of
the husband in the next room

.

.

.

.

imparted to him a confidence in his

undertaking."

11. State v. Larkin, 250 Mo. 218, 157 S. W. 600 (1913) ; People v. Woodward,
45 Cal. 293 (1873) ; Guetling v. State, 198 Ind. 718, 153 N. E. 765 (1926) ; State
v. Farr, 33 Iowa 553 (1871); Connaughty v. State, 1 Wis. 159 (1853).
12. State v. Cox, 65 Mo. 29 (1877) (instruction that defendant was guilty,
if present, approving the offense, held reversible error) ; Smith v. State, 41 Ohio
App. 64, 179 N. E. 696 (1931) (mere approval without expressed concurrence is
not aiding and abetting).
13. State v. Douglass, 44 Kans. 618, 26 Pac. 476 (1890); Clem v. State,
33 Ind. 418 (1870) (reversible error to instruct that defendant is guilty if
present and consenting to the crime).
14. State v. Odbur, 317 -Mo. 372, 295 S. W. 734 (1927).
15. Combs v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 653, 6 S. W. (2d) 1082 (1928);
Hudson v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 831, 14 S. W. (2d) 146 (1929); White v.
People, 81 Ill. 333 (1876); Crosby v. People, 189 Ill. 298, 59 N. E. 546 (1901);
People v. Cione. 293 Ill. 321, 127 N. E. 646 (1920) ; State v. EppF, 213 N. C. 709,
197 S. E. 580 (1938).
16. State v. Bresse, 326 'Mo. 885, 33 S. W. (2d) 919 (1930).
17. "When by prearrangement, or on the spur of the momen., two or more
persons enter upon a common enterprise or adventure, and a criminal offense
is contemplated, then each is a conspirator, and if the purpose is carried out
each is guilty of the offense committed, whether he did any overt act or not."
Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 88, 41 So. 274, 280 (1906), quoted in Jones v. State,
174 Ala. 53, 57 So. 31 (1911). To the same effect, Collins v. State, 88 Ga. 347,
14 S. E. 474 (1892) (confederacy with the absolute perpetrator, supplemented
by constructive presence, makes one a principal in the second degree).
18. 45 Cal. 293 (1873).
19. 62 Mich. 280, 284, 28 N. W. 896, 897 (1886).
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In the principal case the state's theory was that defendant was a lookout,
looking around and watching while her companion committed the offcnse. By
the weight of authority, one who keeps watch while a crime is being perpetrated,
so as to facilitate the escape of the party actually committing it, or to prevent his
actually being interrupted, is an aider and abettor and guilty of the crime accomplished. 20 In some of these lookout, or watching cases, the defeldant participates in the offense by an act which actually assists the actual perpetrator.2 '
In other such cases, the defendant, at the time of the offense, manifests his intention to assist if necessary by an overt act or oral expression.22 In most such
cases the parties are acting in preconcert, and the mere presence of defendant
encourages the actual perpetrator.2 3
In the principal case, there was no evidence that defendant actually assisted
in the commission of the offense, or that, at the time of the taking she communicated to her companion, by overt act or oral expression, her intention to assist
if necessary. Therefore, to convict the defendant of participating in the offense,
the state had to prove that the parties were acting by prearrangement, so that
the very presence of the defendant encouraged her companion. There seems to
be no direct evidence of such a plant, and the court evidently believed the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to submit to the jury.
J. LYNDON STUROIS

FEDERAL PnocEDURE-FINAL JUDGMENT-CAUSE OF ACTION
Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corporation'
The complainant brought this action for infringement of a copyrighted
book called "Test Pilot" by a motion picture of the same name, and for unfair
competition in using the title "Test Pilot" as the title of the motion picture, thereby
causing the public to believe the picture was lawfully based on the book with
the consent of the author. The federal district court dismissed the claim of copy-

20. State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 9 S. W. 646 (1888); Lowe v. State, 125 Ga.
55, 53 S. E. 1038 (1906) ; People v. Courtney, 307 Ill. 441, 138 N. E. 857 (1923) ;
Doan v. State, 26 Ind. 495 (1866); State v. Berger, 121 Iowa 581, 96 N. W.
1094 (1903); State v. Killian, 178 N. C. 753, 101 S. E. 109 (1919); Dixon v.
State, 46 Neb. 298, 64 N. W. 961 (1895) ; People v. Repke, 103 Mich. 459, 61 N. W.
861 (1895); State v. Weekley, 40 Wyo. 162, 275 Pac. 122 (1929); MILLER,
CRIMINAL LAW (1934) 232; 16 C. J. 133.
21. State v. Killian, 178 N. C. 753, 101 S. E. 109 (1919) (defendant fired a
gun to warn those unlawfully distilling liquor of the approach of officers) ; State
v. Weekley, 40 Wyo. 162, 275 Pac. 122 (1929) (defendant, on guard at the entrance
of a cafe, pressed a button warning those inside, selling liquor, of a raid by officers).
22. Dixon v. State, 46 Neb. 298, 64 N. W. 961 (1895) (defendant declared it
was his purpose to keep watch while a doctor performed an abortion).
23. State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 9 S. W. 646 (1888) ; Lowe v. State, 125 Ga.
55, 53 S. E. 1038 (1906); Doan v. State, 26 Ind. 495 (1866); People v. Repke,
103 Mich. 459, 61 N. W. 861 (1895).
1.

106 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1940], Art. 11
19401

RECENT CASES

right infringemcent hecause the facts were insufficient to state a cause of action;
the second claim was not brought to trial. From the order of dismissal the complainant appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That
court held that an appeal would lie though the trial court had not disposed of
the claim for unfair competition joined with it, and upon hearing the cause was
reversed and remanded.
That provision of the Judicial Code which reads, "The circuit courts of appeal
shall have appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal or writ of error final decisions-"'2 has been construed in a great number of cases.2 In Sheppy v. Stevens,1
this same court held that an appeal would not lie from an order sustaining a
demurrer to one of two separate causes of action when the demurrer to the
other cause of action had been overruled, the defendant permitted to withdraw
it and to answer, and the trial of the issues so raised was still pending. The court
held that the appeal would not lie because a judgment was not final which did
not dispose of all the issues in the case. After a review of the decisions in the
other federal circuits,5 and in the light of the new Rules of Civil Procedure, the
court here decided that the case of Sheppy v. Stevens should be overruled. In view
of the extensive provisions made by the new rules for the joinder of several
claims in a single suit, it would be very inconvenient to require an adjudication
of all claims before a separate claim can be reviewed.,, The court must be given
extensive discretionary powers to determine these questions in order to avoid
delay. The rules indicate a definite policy to treat a judgment on a separate claim
as final so that it may be enforced by execution.
The result the court reached in this case seems to be in line with the decisions
of the Supreme Court which have held that an adjudication final in its nature as to
a matter distinct from the general subject of the litigation and affecting only
parties to the particular controversy, may be reviewed without waiting for the
determination of the entire litigation.7 Exc parte National Enameling & Stamping

2. 43 STAT. 936 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 225 (1934) (italics inserted).
3. See cases collected, 28 U. S. C. A. § 225, n. 32 (Supp. 1938). The limits
of the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts of appeal are briefly discussed in
Note (1931) 6 IND. L. J. 341.
4. 200 Fed. 946 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912).
5. Klever v. Seawall, 65 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894) (the finality of a
judgment cannot be affected because the cause of action upon which it was
rendered was united in the same petition with other causes of action which had
not yet been finally adjudicated) ; Scriven v. North, 134 Fed. 366 (C. C. A. 4th,
1904); Historical Pub. Co. v. Jones Bros. Pub. Co., 231 Fed. 784 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1916) (a suit to restrain the infringement of two copyrights. Held that a decree
dismissing the bill as to one is final as to that portion of the contr-oversy, though
it be interlocutory as to the other, and complainant may appeal from that portion
of the decree which was final). Contra: Myles Standish Mfg. v. Champion
Spark Plug Co., 282 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) (a decree for tie plaintiff on
the issues of infringement and unfair competition, and an order for an accounting
for damages and profits for infringement and damages only for unfair competition
held not to be final as to the disallowance of profits from unfair competition so as
to support an appeal by the plaintiff); see Moss v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,
96 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
6. See Rules 13, 14, 18, 20, 42(b), 54(b), and 82.
7. Withenbury v. United States, 5 Wall. 819 (U. S. 1866) (a decree dismissing the claim of one of the claimants for a portion of the property subject
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Co.$ can be distinguished from the present case in that there a suit was brought
for the infringement of a single patent and different claims arose out of the single
invention, some of which were finally disposed of, and others remained in litigation
when an appeal was attempted. The Supreme Court held that the decree was not
final and that no appeal would lie. In the instant case the conduct claimed to
constitute copyright infringement was distinct from the conduct alleged as unfair
competition. The present case may also be distinguished from the cases where the
decree appealed from failed to dispose of the case as to all the defendants involved in the transaction to which the relief was sought.9
In the case of Hum'i v. Oursl',io which laid down the rule that when a federal
court takes jurisdiction of a case because it arises under the laws of the United
States, the court may retain jurisdiction to dispose of the non-federal claim joined
as part of the same cause of action, the Supreme Court held that claims for
copyright infringement and unfair competition are to be regarded as part of a
single cause of action." In that case the two claims were based on exactly the
same facts, so as to be considered not as separate causes of action but as different
grounds asserted in support of the same cause of action. In the principal case the
basis for the claim of unfair competition is different from that of copyright
infringement, as it rests entirely upon identity of title, which is not covered by the
copyright. The evidence to support the two claims is not the same. Upon this
ground the two cases can possibly be dstiguishe(.
The result reached by the court in this case depended upon its determination
of. what constituted a cause of action. Two definitions of the term "cause of
action" are generally encountered. One, that it is such an aggregate of operative
facts as will give rise to at least one right of action, but is not limited to a Single
right. 2 The controlling factor is a matter of trial convenience. This is sometimes
referred to as "the pragmatic definition" of a cause of action.] , The other
definition limits "cause of action" to an action based upon a single "primary

to condemnation as a prize of war, and execution of the cost was ordered; this
was held to be final within the meaning of the Judiciary Act and an appeal allowed); Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527
(1881); Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684 (1884); United States v. River Rouge
Improvement Co., 269 U. S. 411 (1926) (an action for condemnation of land and
gas mains; a new trial was given to the owners of the gas mains and the c(,urt
held the judgment as to the riparian land owners was final and could be appealed.
The court said that an adjudication final in its nature as to a matter distinct from
the general subject of the litigation and affecting only the parties to the particular
controversy could be reviewed without awaiting the determination of the general
litigation) ; cf. Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364 (1920).
8. 201 U. S. 156 (1906).
9. Bank of Rondout v. Smith, 156 U. S. 330 (1895); Hohorst v. HamburgAmerican Packet Co., 148 U. S. 262 (1893).
10. 289 U. S. 238 (1933).
11. Note (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 699; Note (1934) 1 U. OF. CHI. L. REv. 481.
12. Harriss v. Tams, 258 N. Y. 229, 179 N. E. 476 (1932) ; Stafford Security
Co., Inc. v. Kremer, 258 N. Y. 1, 179 N. E. 32 (1931); cf. Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v.
United States, 289 U. S. 28 (1933).
13. Arnold, The Code "Catse of Action" Clarified by United States Si'prenze
Court (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 215.
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It argues that every action must have the elements of a primary right
possessed by the plaintiff, a corresponding primary duty by the defendant, together
with facts which constitute the defendant's delict or act of wrong. The former
16
There
definition is usually identified with Clark,'5 and the latter with Pomeroy.
have been other definitions which deviate slightly from these two.; And in United
right."'

States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co.,1' Mr. Justice Cardozo said: "A 'cause of action'
may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for another.
At times and in certain contexts, it is identified with the infringement of a right
or the violation of a duty. At other times and in other contexts, it is a concept of
the law of remedies. . . . Another aspect reveals it as . . . the group
of operative facts out of which a grievance has developed. This court has not
committed itself to the view that the phrase is susceptible of any single definition.
The court, in holding that the claims for copyright infringement and unfair
competition constituted two separate causes of action, seems to adopt a view
in keeping with the Pomeroy test. Quaere, on facts identical with those of Hum
v. Oursler, which seemed to accept the Clark definition, would the court avail
itself of the varying concept of a cause of action, as enunciated by Mr. Justice
Cardozo, to hold that the judgment of the copyright claim was final and appealable?
It is interesting to note the position taken by Judge Clark in his concurring
opinion, where, in agreeing with the majority of the court, he asserts that the
determination of a cause of action may vary with the particular case. He contends
that this is in keeping with the position taken by him in his textbook and other
writings,19 but while he there admitted that "cause of action" is a flexible concept,
he in no place suggested that it means different things in different places, and his
2
Perhaps recent
work has been generally interpreted to the opposite conclusion.
positive views
the
induced
has
judiciary
of
the
experience with the exigencies
here expressed.
GENE M. UNTERBERGER

14. Hurt v. Haering, 190 Cal. 198, 211 Pac. 228 (1922) ; State v. Lorillard
Co., 181 Wis. 347, 193 N. W. 613 (1923).
15. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 84; Clark, The Code Cause of Action
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 817; Clark, The Cause of Action (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L.
--REV. 354.
16. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) 526-548.
17. Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316, 321 (1927) : "A cause of
action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which
the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more
than one cause of action so long as their result . . . is the -. oiation of but
one right by a single legal wrong . . . 'The facts are merel:- he means, and
not the end. They do not constitute the cause of action, but they show its
existence by making the wrong appear.'" Gavit, A "Pragmatic Definition" of the
"Cause of Action?" (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 129, refers to a definition of a
cause of action as the violation of a substantial right. And see Gavit, The Code
Cause of Action: Joinder and Counterclaims (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 802; McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614.
18. 288 U. S. 62, 67 (1933).
19. See note 16, supra.
20. Consider the implications of CLARK, CODE PLEADIN: (1928) § 19, notes
110 and 146.
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SUFFICIENT TO CREATE JOINT TENAN'Y

State ex. rel. Ashauer v. Hostetter'
Ashauer, the testator, died leaving a will which stipulated, among other provisions, that he devised all his real estate to his two daughters, "as tenants by the
entirety," with the further provision that if the daughter Adelia survived the
daughter Mathilda then she should hold the estate for her sole and separate
use and benefit. The will also provided that Mathilda should have the sole right
to occupy the house so long as she lived. Adelia instituted a suit seeking
construction of the will and partition of the land devised. The other sister demurred on the ground the petition showed that the property was not subject to
partition and that there were no facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The lower court held that since this was a coterminous, and not a successive estate,
it could be partitioned under a Missouri statute2 so providing, and the demurrer
should be overruled. The appellate court quashed a writ of certiorari,holding that
the attempted creation of the estate by the entireties in the two daughters was
unavailing as such an estate could exist only between husband and -wife, and
despite any intention of the testator to create a joint tenancy, there was not such
an express declaration as to be allowed under the provisions of the Missouri
statute3 requiring an express declaration to create such an estate. The daughters,
therefore, were tenants in common of a fee simple absolute, the proviso not being
clear enough to reduce to a life estate a preceding limitation in terms sufficient to
create a fee simple.
Whenever.the four unities-of interest, title, time and possession' were present
in an estate of co-ownership, the early common law courts held the estate to be
one of joint tenancy, that is, an estate held by two or more persons jointly, in
which during the lives of all of the owners they are equally entitled to the enjoyment of the land or its equivalents in rents or profits; but on the death of one,
his share does not devolve to his heirs, but the survivors have the whole estate.
When but one survivor remains the entire estate belongs to him and passes to
his heirs on his death.5 Because of the desire of the common law judges to lessen

1. 127 S. W. (2d) 697 (Mo. 1939), quashing certioraribrought to quash the
decision and opinion in Peer v. Ashauer, 102 S. W. (2d) 764 (Mo. App. 1937).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 1545: "In all cases where lands, teneme' f.
or hereditanents are held in joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or co-parcenary,
including estates in fee, for life, or for years, tenancy by the curtesy and in dowtr.
it shall be lawful for any one or more of the parties interested therein, whether
adults or minors, to file a petition in the-circuit court of the proper county, asking
for the admeasurement and setting off of any dower interest therein, if any,
and for the partition of the remainder, if the same can be done without any great
prejudice to the parties in interest; and if not, then for a sale of the premises, and
a division of the proceeds thereof among all of the parties, according to their
respective rights and interests."
3. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3114.
4. 2 BL. CoMm. *180. The four unities required were that the joint tenants
have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same individual
possession.
5.

TIEDEMAN, REAL PROPERTY (1885)

§

236; 1 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY

(5th ed. 1887) 675; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 190; WILLIAMS,
1926) 193.
REAL
PROPERTY
(24th ed.
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the feudal burdens of the tenants, since only one service was due from all the
joint tenants" and on the death of one joint tenant the other tenants acquired his
share free from the burdens in favor of the lord which ordinarily accrued on the
7
death of a tenant of land, the presumption grew up that a limitation to two or
more persons created a joint tenancy. One authority" believes that the reason for
the presumption lay in the feudal idea that the services due the lord should be
kept entire. Where the intention was present, the courts, of course, construed the
estate as a tenancy in common, a co-ownership in which there is unity of possession but a lack of one or more of the other unities. A tenant in common has an
undivided interest in the land so far as possession is concerned, but in all other
9
respects he has the interests of a tenant in severalty. As has been noted, the most

important difference in result between the two estates depends on the doctrine of
survivorship. This doctrine appears to be an outgrowth of the concept of the
joint tenancy as but one estate, a theory which conceives of the interest as being
0
extinguished at death, leaving nothing to pass to the heirs or devisees.' The equity
courts, however, began to regard these estates as tenancies in common, especially
where the parties had advanced money upon the estates. 1 With the practical
abolition of tenures, the reason for the law court's policy ceased, and the courts
of equity, regarding the doctrine of survivorship as productive of great hardships
in depriving the heirs of a property inheritance, showed a disposition to seize upon
any indication of intent in their efforts to construe an instrument as creating a
2
The early American cases,
tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy.'
while applying the presumption, opposed the joint tenancy bitterly in dicta, and
favored the tenancy in common."3 In one or two jurisdictions the courts have,
14
without legislative aid, limited or denied' the English common law presumption
of joint tenancy.

In Connecticut, which accepted the presumption, survivorship

6. Co. LITT. *70b; 2 BL. ComIM. *180.
7. Butler v. Archer, Owen 152 (K. B. 1650); Fisher v. Wigg, 1 Salk. 390
(K. B. 1795).
8. 1 WASHBURN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 675.
9. TIEDEMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 239; 1 TIFFANY, op. Cit. supra note 5,
§ 190; 1 WASHBURN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 685; WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note
5, at 202; Brown v. Wellington, 106 Mass. 318 (1871); Butler v. Roys, 25 Mich.
52 (1872).
10. 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 5, § 191. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 5.
at 208, an important use of joint tenancy in England today is for the purpose of
vesting estates in trustees who are invariably made joint tenants. See Duncan
v. Forrer, 6 Binn. 193 (Pa. 1813).
11. Rigden v. Vallier, 2 VEs. SEN. 252 (Ch. 1751). For an excelltnt comment on the history of the attitude the courts have taken in the constri,tion of
these estates of concurrent ownership see Note (1910) 23 HARV. L. REv. 214;
1 WASHBURN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 676.
12. Lake v. Craddock, 3 P. WMs. 158 (Ch. 1732); Rigden v. Vallier, 2 VEs.
SEN. 252 (Ch. 1751) ; Jolliffe v. East, 3 BRO. C. C., 25 (Ch. 1789) ; 1 TIFFANY, Op.
cit. aupra note 5, § 191. For a summary of the history of the courts attitude see
the opinion by Marshall, J., in Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. 91, 73 S. W. 202
(1903).
13. Noble v. Teeple, 58 Kan. 398 (1897); Martin v. Smith, 5 Binn. 16 (Pa.
1812).
14. Martin v. Smith, 5 Binn. 16 (Pa. 1812).
15. Vreeland v. Van Ryper, 17 N. J. Eq. 133 (1864).
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was rejected.' In the absence of statutory provisions, however, the courts in
their holdings mainly followed the English decisions. 1 7 The states have adopted
statutes of various types tending to greatly restrict the application of the joint
tenancy presumption, or abolishing the incident of survivorship where a joint
tenancy is created, or abolishing the estate altogether."- The Missouri statute"'
states: "Every interest in real estate granted or devised to two or more persons,
other than executors and trustees and husband and wife, shall be a tenancy in
common, unless expressly declared, in such grant or devise, to be in joint tenancy."
This statute is typical of those in other states abolishing the common law presumption of joint tenancy, and favoring a presumption of tenancy in common.
In the instant case it seems that the court has applied the statute with
severity. It is clear that the estate limited could not be a tenancy by the entireties,
for such an estate can exist only if the persons to whom the conveyance is made
are husband and wife at the time the instrument takes effect2 0 Since survivorship
is the most important incident of a tenancy by the entireties, it is obvious that the
intention of the testator was to create an estate of co-ownership with an incident

16. Phelps v. Jepson, 1 Root 48 (Conn. 1769).
17. Barclay v. Hendrick's Heirs, 3 Dana 378 (Ky. 1835); Decamp v. Hall,
42 Vt. 483 (1869).
18. Hardly any two statutes on the subject are identical in their provisions,
but they have been classified by BREWSTER, CONVEYANCE (1904) § 151, as:
(a) "Those reversing the common law rule that an estate granted or devised to
twQ or more persons is presumed to create a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in
common, " (In-a subsection the author lists Ark., Cal., Colo., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa,
Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., N. H., N. Y., N. D., R. I., S. D., Utah,
Vt., Wis.). Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302 (1869).
(b) "Those destroying survivorship;" (In a subsection the author lists Ala.,
Colo., Ill., Kan., N. C., Pa., S. C., Tenn., Va., Wash., W. Va.). Parsons v. Boyd,
20 Ala. 112 (1852).
o (c) "Those expressly abolishing joint tenancy." (In a subsection the author
lists Ga. & Ore.).
Ohio and Connecticut held joint tenancies did not exist at common law.
Phelps v. Jepson, 1 Root 48 (Conn. 1769); Miles v. Fisher, 10 Ohio 1 (1840).
The question of retroactivity in connection with these statutes has been the
subject of interesting legal discussion. Some jurisdictions have held that existing
jcint tenancies could not be changed into tenancies in common, Dewey v. Lambier,
7 Cal. 347 (1857); Butte & B. C. M. Co. v. Montana 0. P. Co., 25 Mont. 41, 63
Pac. 825 (1901); see Greer v. Blanchar, 40 Cal. 194 (1870). The weight of
authority, however, holds that such statutes are valid as operating merely to
render the estate more beneficial. The reasoning has been that the legislature
may destroy the rights of survivorship in joint tenants as it is a mere conth.ency destructible by either of the joint tenants, Bambaugh v. Bambaugh, 11
S. & R. 190 (Pa. 1824), and in a like manner a statute making joint heirs tenants
in common may embrace estates existing at the time of its passage, Stevenson v.
Cofferin. 20 N. H. 150 (1849). An act changing the tenure of trustees from joint
tenancy to tenancy in common, however, is void as to existing trusts, Boston
Franklinite Co. v. Condit, 19 N. J. Eq. 394 (1869).
19. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3114. The Missouri statute is similar to other
state statutes which are not applicable to trustees on the theory that it is desirable
that there be no division of the legal title on the death of one of the trustees:
Parsins v. Boyd. 20 Ala. 112 (1852) ; Webster v. Vandeventer, 6 Gray 428 (Mass.
1S56 : Gray v. Lynch and McDonald, 8 Gill 403 (Md. 1849). Likewise the statute
does not apply to husband and wife and the tenancy by the entireties still exists
in Missouri: Harrison v. McRevnolds, 183 Mo. 533, 82 S.W. 120 (1904); Peters
v. Pe:ers. 312 Mo. 609, 280 S.W. 424 (1926).
20. 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 5, § 194; 1 WASHBURN, op. cit. supra
note 5. at 706.
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of survivorship. Such an intention is clear in the ineffective devise and in the
later express provision for the surviving daughter to take the entire estate. The
court, however, refuses to carry out his intention. The problem of what constitues a sufficient declaration under a statute similar to that existing in Missouri
2
is one on which the courts have offered a variety of interpretations. In one case '
a statement that the donees were to hold "jointly" was held to be a sufficient
express declaration, but such an expression has been held insufficient in other
2
jurisdictions. 2 A gift to two or more persons and their survivors was held to
2
create a joint tenancy, as was a gift to two persons for their joint lives and to
25
24
In one case, however,
the survivor of them during his or her natural life.
the words "jointly, the survivor to have full ownership" created a tenancy in

common, not a joint tenancy.
The Missouri cases seem to have required strict conformity to the words of
the statute in order to create a joint tenancy. The doctrine that the intention of
23
the testator should be carried out 1 is disregarded. The court in the instant case
states: "This rock-ribbed rule (intention of testator) of construction, so strictly
and faithfully followed in this state, is subject to this very vital qualification,
to wit, that it must not conflict with any inflexible rule or requirement of law."
A number of declarations which would seem to show definitely a desire to create
27
The instant
a joint tenancy have been construed to create tenancies in common.
comdisregarding
in
cases
Missouri
prior
of
the
any
than
case has gone further
pletely any intent of the testator with respect to the construction in question.
It would seem that in Missouri no other words except "in joint tenancy" or perhaps
"as joint tenants" will create an estate in joint tenancy.2 8
In the instant case the court took great pains to lay down an ironclad rule
for the creation of a joint tenancy, within the "express declaration" requirement
of the statute. In view, however, of the fact that the Missouri statute providing

21. Case y. Owen, 139 Ind. 22, 38 N. E. 395 (1894).
22. Davis v. Smith, 4 Harr. 68 (Dela. 1843); Mustain v. Gardner, 203 Ill.
284, 67 N. E. 779 (1903) ; Doran v. Beale, 106 Miss. 305, 63 So. 647 (1913) ; Overheiser v. Lackey, 207 N. Y. 229, 100 N. E. 738 (1912).
23. Wood v. Logue, 167 Iowa 436, 149 N. W. 613 (1914) ; Stimpson v. Batterman, 5 Cush. 153 (Mass. 1849).
24. Pritchard v. Walker, 22 Ill. App. 286 (1887).
25. Wright v. Knapp, 183 Mich. 656, 150 N. W. 315 (1915).
26. Nichols v. Boswell, 103 Mo. 151, 15 S. W. 343 (1890); Garth v. Garth,
139 Mo. 456, 41 S. W. 238 (1897); Grace v. Perry, 197 Mo. 550, 95 S. W. 875
(1906); Gardner v. Vanlandingham, 334 Mo. 1054, 69 S. W. (2d) 947 (1934).
27. "To be joint property transferable by joint deed," Rodney v. Landau,
104 Mo. 251, 15 S. W. 962 (1891); "Secondly, I will to my sons . . . . property," Lemmons v. Reynolds, 170 Mo. 227, 71 S. W. 135 (1902); "to said caughters
Julia and Victoria jointly," Cohen v. Herbert, 205 Mo. 537, 104 S. V. F (1907);
"give, and bequeath to my beloved wife . . . and my beloved niec,.
to have and hold during their natural life," Philbert v. Campbell, 317 Mo. 556,
296 S. W. 1001 (1927). For a construction of such statutes similar to that of the
Missouri cases see Cockrill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580 (1876) ; Estate of Hittell,
141 Cal. 432 (1903); Mustain v. Gardner, 203 Ill.284 (1903); In re Kimberly,
150 N. Y. 90 (1896); Seely v. Seely, 44 Pa. St. 434 (1863).
28. A recent Missouri writer speaks of the instant case as establishing a
new rule of law, "Intention is not considered in construing wills." Gill, Work of
Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1937 (Property) (1938) 3 Mo. L. REv. 398.
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for the partition of estates2', provides for partition in the case of either joint
tenancies or tenancies in common, it would seem that it was not material to the
decision whether the estate was in joint tenancy or a tenancy in common. The
decision, therefore, as to the type of estate created was dictum. On the other
hand, a fair search of the Missouri cases has revealed no case allowing partition
of an estate which was clearly a joint tenancy. The court, therefore, may be
holding that a joint tenancy cannot be partitioned, or can be partitioned only to a
limited extent, despite the express words of the statute. If this is the case, the
courts view that the estate in question was a tenancy in common is holding and
not dictum, since partition was permitted.
It may be possible in some cases to avoid the operation of the statute creating
the presumption of tenancy in common by showing the intention of the testator
or grantor, the lack of clarity in the expression, and a mutual mistake, in a suit
for equitable reformation of the deed or will.3o Such a procedure might also
3

escape the limiting difficulties of the parol evidence rule.

t

It is possible that the courts may construe a limitation to be a tenancy in
32
common for life with a contingent remainder in favor of the survivor, or as a
tenancy in common in fee simple with an executory interest in favor of the
survivor.33 It seems doubtful, however, whether in view of the present attitudes
of courts and legislative bodies toward the doctrine of survivorship such steps
will be taken to avoid the statute creating the- presumption of joint tenancy.
JOHN H. GUNN

RECEIVERSHIP-DISTRIBUTION OF FEES AND COSTS BETWEEN APPLICANT AND
RECEIVER
Bowersock Mills & Power Co. v. Joycel
Plaintiff, a broker under contract with defendant to distribute its products
in six states, sued for breach of contract, and defendant cross-complained for an
accounting, for an injunction to prevent plaintiff from disposing of perishable
goods belonging to defendant and in plaintiff's possession, the disposal of which
goods in a perished state might injure defendant's business, and for the appointment of a temporary -eceiver to take possession of such property. Such a re-

29. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 1545.
30. MIcVey v. Phillips, 259 S. W. 1065 (1924) ; see Peters v. Peters, 312 Mo.
609, 280 S.W. 424 (1926).
31. "When a legal act is reduced into a single memorial, all other utterances
of the parties on that topic are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining
what are the terms of their act." 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1905) § 2425.
32. "A tenancy in common with benefit of survivorship is a case which
may exist, without being a jointenancy; because survivorship is not the only
characteristic of jointenancy." Bayley, J., in Doe v. Abey, 1 M. & S. 428 (K. B.
1813). Mittel v. Karl, 133 Ill. 65, 24 N. E. 553 (1890) ; Schulz v. Brohl, 116 Mich.
603, 74 N. W. 1012 (1898) ; Hannon v. Christopher. 34 N. J. Eq. 459 (1881).
33. Rowland v. Rowland, 93 N. C. 214 (1885).
1.

101 F. (2d) 1000 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
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ceiver was appointed and for almost three years took the appropriate steps to
acquire possession of and dispose of the property. After that time the defendant
informed the court that a settlement had been reached, whereupon the receiver
filed a final report showing that expenditures and disbursements left of the fund
of the receivership a balance of only $578.46. Upon motion for allowance of
receiver's fees, defendant admitted that the services of the receiver and his attorney were most satisfactory, and fees were awarded for the full amount asked,
$2500, and charged against the defendant. The defendant, appellant, contended
(1) that the fees were chargeable only against the receivership fund, and (2)
that the court failed to consider the balance of $578.46 remaining in the hands
of the receiver. The circuit court of appeals modified the order to the extent that
the balance of $578.46 should be deducted from the amount charged the defendant, but affirmed the order in all other respects. The court held that this case
presented sufficient grounds for the exercise of equitable discretion to be an
exception to the general rule that when a receiver is properly and lawfully appointed his compensation is to be charged only against the receivership funds.
In the typical situation the petitioner seeks a receiver of the defendant's
property. Adjudication that the cost of the receivership should be paid out of
receivership funds is, at least where there is any surplus to be returned to the
defendant, tantamount to imposing the cost on the defendant. Where the receivership assets do not satisfy the claims against them, the issue is whether the costs
shall be borne by all the creditors (i. e., taken from the fund in priority to other
claims), by the petitioning creditor alone, or by the receiver himself.
Ultimately, the determination of the question rests upon the chancellor's
discretion, 2 but as in all other cases of equity discretion, its exercise has been
formulated along well settled lines. Perhaps the most uniformly recognized rule
is that a receiver regularly and lawfully appointed by a court of competent
jurisdiction who has faithfully performed the duties of his trust is entitled to
reasonable compensation for his services, and should be paid primarily from the
fund in his possession. 3 This rule is grounded in the basic principle that such

2. McIntosh v. Ward, 159 Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907); Fulp v. McCray, 21
F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Speakman v. Bryan, 61 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A.
5th, 1932); W. F. Potts Son & Co. v. Cochrane, 59 F. (2d) 375 (C. C. A. 5th,
1932); Sullivan Timber Co. v. Black, 159 Ala. 570, 48 So. 870 (1909); Carter
v. Mitchell, 225 Ala. 287, 142 So. 514 (1932); Turner v. Shupin, 166 Ga. 806,
144 S. E. 274 (1928); Brock v. Rudug, 119 N. E. 491 (Ind. App. 1918); French
v. Gifford, 31 Iowa 428 (1871); Farmers Nat. Bank v. Backus, 74 Minn. 264, 77
N. W. 142, 143 (1898) ; Pullis v. Pullis Bros. Iron Co., 90 Mo. App. 244 (1901) ;
Berry v. Rood, 209 Mo. 662, 108 S. W. 22 (1908); Sklar v. Bernstein, 7 Tenn.
App. 593 (1928); Espuela Land & Cattle Co. v. Bindle, 11 Tex. C*". Apr. 262,
32 S. W. 582 (1895).
3. Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 208 U. S. 360, 371-373 (1908), . zrguson
v. Dent, 46 Fed. 88 (C. C. Tenn. 1891); Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jennings, 90
Fed. 767 (C. C. D. W. Va. 1898); French v. Gifford, 31 Iowa 428 (1871); Crump
& Field v. First Nat'l Bank, 229 Ky. 526, 17 S. W. (2d) .1,16 (1929); State
e.c inf. Hadley v. People's United States Bank, 197 Mo. 605, 95 S. W. 867 (1906);
Berry v. Rood, 209 Mo. 662, 108 S. W. 22 (1908) ; State v. State Bank & Trust
Co., 36 Nev. 526, 137 Pac. 400 (1913); In re Atlas Iron Const. Co., 19 App. Div.
415, 46 N. Y. Supp. 467 (1897); Cutter v. Pollock, 4 N. D. 205, 59 N. W. 1062
(1894).
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a receiver is not an agent of the applicant but an officer of the court, and
should look to the court and the fund in court for his compensation.'
The
principle has been applied even where the funds are insufficient to pay the costs,
leaving the receiver to carry the deficit,5 though the facts of the particular case
may vary the rule. Thus, in cases in which the suit was dismissed by the applicant, or in which the receivership was peculiarly beneficial to the applicant,the costs are apt to be assessed against him, whereas in cases in which the
receiver proceeded without judicial sanction, he may well find that he has worked
for naught.S
In cases in which the court has no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, but
does so, the rule is well settled that the costs may not be taken out of the receivership funds,9 but the receiver must look to the party at whose instance he was
appointed for compensation.1o Such decisions are grounded upon the proposition
either that as the court has no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver then it has no
jurisdiction to assess the costs, or that the court has no jurisdiction over the fund
so cannot pay out of it."1 But even to this firm rule there are exceptions.
Examples of these are cases in which all the parties have acquiesced in the appointment,'2 or where the person appointed as a receiver is disqualified to act as

4. Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 208 U. S. 360 (1908); Alexander v.
Hillman, 296 U. S. 222 (1935); Berry v. Rood, 209 Mo. 662, 108 S. W. 22 (1908).
5. Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 208 U. S. 360 (1908); Crump & Field v.
First Nat'l Bank, 229 Ky. 526, 17 S. W. (2d) 436 (1929) ; Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co. v. Oregon Pac. R. R., 31 Ore. 237, 48 Pac. 706 (1897); 2 TARDY'S SMITH ON
REcErvERs (2d ed. 1920) § 616;
6. Burrows v. Merrifield, 243 Ill. 362, 90 N. E. 750 (1909) (statute provided
that upon the complainant dismissing his bill in equity the defendant should
recover against the complainant full costs); McHarg v. Commonwealth Finance
Corp., 195 App. Div. 862, 187 N. Y. Supp. 540 (1921).
7. Bowersock Mills & Power Co. v. Joyce, 101 F. (2d) 1000 (C. C. A. 8th,
1939); Welch v. Renshaw, 14 Colo. App. 526, 59 Pac. 967 (1900).
8. Heisen v. Binz, 147 Ind. 284, 45 N. E. 104 (1896).
9. McIntosh v. Ward, 159 Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907); Hawes v. First
Nat'l Bank, 229 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); State of Missouri v. Angle, 236
Fed. 644 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); Ephraim v. Pacific Bank, 129 Cal. 589, 62 Pac.
177 (1900); Sullivan v. Gage, 145 Cal. 759, 79 Pac. 537 (1905); Tabor v. Bank
of Leadville, 35 Colo. 1, 83 Pac. 1060 (1905) ; Moyers v. Coiner, 22 Fla. 422
(1886) ; McAnrow v. Martin, 183 Ill. 467, 56 N. E. 168 (1899) ; French v. Gifford,
31 Iowa 428 (1871); People ex rel. Port Huron & G. Ry. v. Jones, 33 Mich. 303
(1876); St. Louis, K. & S. R. R. v. Wear, 135 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 357 (1896);
State ex inf. Hadley v. People's United States Bank, 197 Mo. 605, 95 S. W. 867
(1906) (so held, even though the State of Missouri was the plaintiff and no
judgment for costs can be rendered against the state) ; State ex rel. Fischer v.
Thomas, 249 Mo. 103, 155 S. W. 401 (1913) ; City of St. Louis v. St. Louis GasLight Co., 11 Mo. App. 237 (1881); Bushman v. Barlow, 328 Mo. 90, 40 S. W.
(2d) 637 (1931); Ford v. Gilbert, 42 Ore. 528, 71 Pac. 971 (1903); Roberts
Tel. & Elec. Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 155 S. W. 629 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1913); 2 TARDY'S SMITH ON RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1920) § 627.
10. Sullivan v. Gage, 145 Cal. 759, 79 Pac. 537 (1905); State ecx inf. Hadley
v. People's United States Bank, 197 Mo. 605, 95 S. W. 867 (1906).
11. See note 9, supra.
12. Ferguson v. Dent, 46 Fed. 88 (C. C. Tenn. 1891); State Journal Co. v.
Commonwealth Co.. 43 Kans. 93, 22 Pac. 982 (1890); Cutter v. Pollock, 7 N. D.
631, 76 N. W. 235 (1898). See Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 291 Fed.
754 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1923), affirmed on other grounds, 274 U. S. 208 (1927), which
holds that acquiescence need not be express, but may be constructive or implied.
Although the court held that there was a lack of jurisdiction in that case, they
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such, but performs in good faith, and no objection is made on that ground,

"

or

4
where the receiver's services were of great benefit to the estate administered.1
In such cases the costs may be taken out of the funds.
The most troublesome question is presented in cases in which the appointment of the receiver is not invalid for lack of jurisdiction, but was nevertheless
improvident or inequitable.15 It is generally held under such facts that the costs
and expenses are not to be taken from the fund.", The receiver, however, is
entitled to compensation, and the court has power to order it paid, which it usually
does-assessing the compensation as costs against the applicant. 17 But it must be
borne in mind that, as such a decision is the result of the exercise of discretion
by the court, the mere fact that a party is successful on the merits of the action
giving rise to the appointment of a receiver is not conclusive in determining who
shall bear the expense.' 8 The decisions which assess the costs against the
applicant are generally based either upon the reason that the losing party is
liable for the costs, or upon the equitable ground that it would be unjust that one

stated that a party will be held to have acquiesced, in a case where jurisdiction
is lacking, despite a challenge to jurisdiction, if his challenge were based wholly
upon an untenable ground; for, by objecting only on the untenable ground, he
may have misled the court as much as if he had not objected at all. It was said
that the defendant's failure to object, or to appeal from the decree of appointment,
amounted to acquiescence on his part. Query: How is it possible for a defendant
by acquiescence, express or implied, or even by stipulation, to confer jurisdiction,
or waive the lack of it, upon a federal district court?
13. James v. Roberts Tel. & Elec. Co., 206 S. W. 933 (Tex. 1918).
14. Tabor v. Bank of Leadville, 35 Colo. 1, 83 Pac. 1060 (1905); Pullis v.
Pullis Bros. Iron Co., 90 Mo. App. 244 (1901).
15. Fulp v. McCray, 21 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), sets out the following facts as essential to render the appointment of a receiver provident and
equitable: (1) the fact that there was an imminent danger that the property
would deteriorate in value or the proceeds be wasted during the pendency of
the suit, (2) the fact that plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss from such
deterioration and waste, and (3) that there was a strong probability that the
plaintiff would prevail on the merits of the case.
16. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Newman, 187 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 7th, 1911);
Hawes v. First Nat'l Bank, 229 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Fulp v. McCray,
21 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Moyers v. Coiner, 22 Fla. 422 (1886) ; Etna
Steel & Iron Co. v. Hamilton, 133 Ga. 85, 65 S. E. 145 (1909); McAnrow v.
Martin, 183 Ill. 467, 56 N. E. 168 (1899) ; Frick v. Fritz, 124 Iowa 529, 100 N. W.
513 (1904); Berry v. Rood, 209 Mo. 662, 108 S. W. 22 (1908); State ex,- rel.
Fischer v. Thomas, 249 Mo. 103, 155 S. W. 401 (1913); City of St. Louis v.
St. Louis Gas-Light Co., 11 Mo. App. 237 (1881); Pullis v. Pullis Bros. Iron Co.,
90 Mo. App. 244 (1901); Sheldon v. Parker, 66 Neb. 610, 92 N. W. 923 (1902);
Phillips v. Hudson Film Co., 82 N. Y. Misc. 385, 143 N. Y. Supp. 759 (1913);
Bellamy v. Washita Valley Tel. Co., 25 Okla. 18, 105 Pac. 340 (1909); Delcambre
v. Murphy, 5 S. W. (2d) 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); 1 CLARK ON RECEIVERS
(2d ed. 1929) § 641; 2 TARDY'S SMITi ON RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1920) § 627.
17. McIntosh v. Ward, 159 Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907); In re Went- :orth
Lunch Co., 191 Fed. 821 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911); Wills Valley Mining & _Mfg. Co. v.
Galloway, 155 Ala. 628, 47 So. 141 (1908); Myers v. Hines, 122 Ark. 320, 182
S. W. 542 (1916); Berry v. Rood, 209 Mo. 662, 108 S. W. 22 (1908); Pullis v.
Pullis Bros. Iron Co., 90 Mo. App. 244 (1901); People v. Oriental Bank, 129
App. Div. 865, 114 N. Y. Supp. 440 (1909); Nutter v. Brown, 58 W. Va. 237,
52 S. E. 88 (1905) (holds that the fee should be allowed out of the fund, and the
respondent be given judgment for that amount); 2 TARDY'S SMITHI ON RECEIVERS
(2d ed. 1920) § 627.
18. Brock v. Rudug, 119 N. E. 491 (Ind. App. 1918).
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subjected to an unfounded suit should be compelled to pay the expenses of having
his property taken away and handled by a stranger.
Numerous exceptions attend the rule last stated, and a broader exercise of
discretion is perceived in these cases than the others discussed above. 1" Equally
sound results might be reached by discarding this rule altogether and relying
simply on equitable factors of the particular cases. It may well be noted that
when the discretion of the trial judge is exercised the presumption on appeal is
in favor of his action."
As may be seen from the cases cited in the preceding footnotes, the decisions
of the courts of Missouri are substantially in accord with the rules set out
above.
In the instant case a peculiar situation was presented. The property which
the receiver gathered in and liquidated belonged to the claimant himself, and
was insufficient to meet the receiver's personal claims. It not being a general
receivership, there-were no other creditors, and the issue was solely between the
petitioner and the receiver. The court had jurisdiction to make the appointment,
which apparently was neither irregular nor inequitable, but the contest to which
the receivership was incident never reached the point of decision on its merits.
Although the receiver pursued the activities which produced this situation-a
,bill for service in excess of the fund realized-without submitting to an earlier
scrutiny of the court which might have prevented it, this unwise and in many
cases fatally prejudicial behavior was balanced by the acquiescence of the applicant, who at no time suggested a termination of the receivership, although it
must have known. that the expense of recovering this widely scattered and
deteriorated merchandise would be out of proportion to its value. Having sought
this service through the receivership proceedings, it is not unjust that it should
pay for it.
Presumably this petitioner was financially responsible. The ever present
possibility that the costs of the receivership sought will ultimately be assessed
against the applicant suggests that he be required, upon filing his petition, to
execute a bond designed to meet such an eventuality. Where such bonds are
now required, the practice has been to minimize their importance, with the
result that those who are forced to look to the bond may not be fully protected
in the end. Where bonds, as suggested, are required, their effect is to assure
the receiver his compensation, minimizing the importance of the vexing problem
of whether the receiver must look directly to the plaintiff for compensation 21 or
may compensate himself from the funds in his hands before returning them to
the defendant, forcing the latter to proceed against the plaintiff for reimburse-

19. Brock v. Rudug, 119 N. E. 491 (Ind. App. 1918); Capital City Tob. Co.
v. Anderson, 138 Ga. 667, 75 S. E. 1040 (1912); Hembree v. Dawson, 18 Ore.
474, 23 Pac. 264 (1890).
20. See note 19, supra. See also Pullis v. Pullis Bros. Iron Co., 90 Mo. App.
244 (1901).
21. In re Lacov, 142 Fed. 960 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905); In re Charles W.
Aschenbach Co., 183 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); In re Wentworth Lunch Co.,
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ment.2 2 Such a bond as is suggested here has always been required in injunction

proceedings, and there seems to be no distinction between the problem arising there
and the one confronted upon the application for a receivership.
THOMAS E. DEACY, JR.

WILLS-DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION-PARTIAL

INVALIDITY OF CODICIL

Blackford v. Anderson,
In 1923, the testator executed his will, appointing two executors, and bequeathing a specified sum to Henry County and the residue of his estate to Lee County,
both to be used to build hard surface roads under the supervision of the boards of
supervisors of the respective counties. In 1926, he executed a codicil providing for
the appointment of three executors who were to act as trustees of the estate,
which was to be used in building specified hard surfaced roads in the two counties.
In 1930, the testator executed a second codicil which provided that should there be
any conflict between that instrument and the prior instruments, the latter instrument should prevail. This was followed by a formal clause of revocation.
In this codicil it was provided that the estate should be used for the paving of
roads in Lee County alone. Blackford, who was named sole executor, was given
full power and authority to prepare all the plans and specifications for the
highways, without the cooperation of the board of supervisors.
The executor brought this suit in equity to construe the will, as it was contended that the provision giving the executor this power would make an acceptance of the bequest by Lee County unlawful, as it would be a surrender of
governmental functions in the control over the public highway. The court held:
First, that the provisions of the second codicil did not constitute an express
revocation of the entire will and first codicil; and second, assuming the provisions
of the second codicil as to the control of the project by the executor to be unlawful,
the doctrine of dependant relative revocation applied so that the lawful means
designated by the will and first codicil should be effective. The opinion then
approved the decree of the court below, which provided that the executor should
proceed in the administration of the estate under the second codicil, and that he
should from time to time confer with the board of supervisors. The court then
lays down the rule that specific instructions must give way to the general intent
of the testator.:

191 Fed. 821 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911); In re Hurlburt Motors, In., %75 Fed. 62
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1920); note (1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 466.
22. See In re Independent Machine & Tool Corp., Inc., 251 Fed. 484 (C. C. A.
2d, 1918) ; see also In re T. E. Hill Co., 159 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907) ; note
(1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 466.
1. 286 N. W. 735 (Iowa 1939).
2. Id. at 755: "The court further finds that any directions given in said
last will and codicils with reference to the manner or method of administration
must give way to the general intent and purpose of the testator, and the court
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The first consideration in the case is the effect of the express clause of
revocation. The testator designated the instrument as a second codicil to the
will and first codicil, and he provided that the second codicil should prevail in
the case of any conflict. The intention of the testator should be the test in determining how far the revocation of a will is affected by a codicil.3' It is well
settled that a later testamentary statement that it was the last will and testament
4
of the testator has, of itself, no revocatory force or effect. Thus, a reading of the

codicil as a whole seems to justify the result the court reaches.The next consideration is the court's application of the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation. The courts have often held that where a testator purports
to revoke his will while laboring under a mistake of law or facta the will is not
revoked. The courts do not require an actual conditional state of mind on the
part of the testator, but include under the classification of dependent relative
revocation both cases of revocation under mistake and conditional revocation.7
Some courts do not take this view in regard to a mistake. This doctrine was
applied at a very early date by the English courts,s and it has been recognized by
most American courts today. " The courts have applied the doctrine freely in
cases of revocation by physical act and alterations of the terms of the will.10 But
in the cases where there were express clauses of revocation and the bequests
failed for some reason dehors the instrument, most courts have refused to give

finds that it was the intent and purpose of the testator that his executor should
aonvert the same into cash, and that after deducting
administer said estate and
the expenses of administration, the remainder and residue of said estate should
be used by Lee County, Iowa, in the construction of the specific highway designated."
3. Gelbke v. Gelbke, 88 Ala. 427, 6 So. 834 (1889); 68 C. J. 812. Contra:
Limbach v. Limbach, 290 Ill. 94, 124 N. E. 859 (1919); Bloodgood v. Lewis, 209
N. Y. 95, 102 N. E. 610 (1913) ; Malone v. Moberly, 55 S.W. (2d) 1008 (Mo. 1932).
4. Neibling v. Methodist Orphans' Home Ass'n, 315 Mo. 578, 286 S.W. 58
(1926) (expressed the view that a subsequent will described as the testatrix's last
will and testament is entitled to very little weight in determining whether it should
supersede the original or earlier will); Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N. W.
705 (1903) ; In re Venable's Will, 127 N. C. 344, 37 S.E. 465 (1900) ; 68 C. J. 803.
5. Gelbke v. Gelbke, 88 Ala. 427, 6 So. 834 (1889) (held that a will is not
revoked by a codicil made and published later, containing the following language:
"As codicil to the foregoing last will and testament, and to be taken as a parf
thereof. I . . . hereby declare that I revoke and annul all wills by me
heretofore made, ..

6. Strong's Appeal, 79 Conn. 123, 63 AtI. 1089 (1906); Onions v. Tyrer.
1 P. Wins. 343, 2 Vern. 741 (Ch. 1716).
7. ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) 386; Warren, Dependent Relative Rci'oration
(1920) 33 HARv. L. REV. 377; cf. Evans, Book Review (1937) 15 N. C. L. RFv.441
(takes the view that dependent relative revocation is applicable to the cases where
the revocation is accomplished by act to-the document, but that it does not apply
where the mistaken revocation is by subsequent instrument).
8. Onions v. Tyrer, 1 P. Wms. 343, 2 Vern. 741 (Ch. 1716) ; Attorney General v. Ward, 3 Ves. Jun. 327 (Ch. 1797); Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. Jun. 321
(Ch. 1797).
9. Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 39 AtI. 153 (1898) ; Sanderson v.
Norcross, 242 Mass. 43, 136 N. E. 170 (1921) ; Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276
(1855) ; In re Dougan's Estate, 152 Or. 235, 53 P. (2d) 511 (1936).
10. Thomas v. Thomas, 76 Minn. 237, 79 N. W. 104 (1899); Gardner v.
Gardiner, 65 N. H. 230, 19 Atl. 651 (1889) ; Dobie, Dependent Relative Revoca tion
of Wills (1915) 2 VA. L. REv. 327.
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relief, either upon the ground of mistake or by calling the revocation conditional."
However, the better opinion is that the doctrine may apply in such cases, since it
can be inferred that the earlier will was revoked only to give effect to the later
and if for any cause the later will is inoperative the earlier will takes effect.

12

The court held that since the testator intended to make a valid disposition of his
estate, and failed to do so because of a mistake of law or fact, the second codicil
would not revoke the will and first codicil. 13
Query: Has the court, in fact, applied the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation? The court held that because of the mistake of law the will and first
codicil were not revoked; but the court does not look to the will and first codicil
to find and carry out their provisions. The court simply changed the provisions
of the second codicil, ".

.

.

that the said P. A. Blackford shall have full power

and authority, without the cooperation of the said Board of Supervisors,

.

he shall from time to time confer with the Board of
.
.
to read that, ".
" This latter provision was not taken
Supervisors of Lee County, Iowa

from any prior will or codicil.
It was also urged upon the court that this was a proper case for the application of the equitable principle of cy pres. Under this doctrine, if property
is given in trust for a particular charitable purpose and it becomes impossible
or illegal to carry out the trust in the manner the settlor provided, the court will
direct it to be carried out in a manner which falls within the general charitable
intention. 14 This doctrine is limited to charitable trusts, and the trust need not
5
be express if the general charitable intent is shown.1 The cy pres power has been
generally accepted as a part of the authority of a court of general equitable jurisdiction; 11 and it appears that the Iowa court had such a power which could be
exercised in a case of this nature.' 7
11. Mort v. Trustees of Baker University, 229 Mo. App. 632, 78 S.W. (2d)
498 (1935) (held that where there was a properly executed second will and the
bequest failed because of uncertainty as to the beneficiary, the first will was
revoked by the second) ; Ely v. Megie, 219 N. Y. 112, 113 N. E. 800 (1916);
Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 Atl. 679 (1914); Tupper v. Tupper, 1 K. & J.
665 (Ch. 1855).
12. Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 39 Atl. 153 (1898) ; In re Bernard's
Settlement, 1 Ch. 552 (1916); ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) 394; Cornish, Dependent
Relative Revocation (1932) 5 So. CALIF. L. REv. 273.
13. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Douglas' Trustee, 134 Ky. 374, 120
S. W. 328 (1909) ; In re Tremain's Will, 169 Misc. 549, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 781 (1938).
14. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §§ 397-99; 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES (1935) 1287: "Roughly speaking, it (cy pres) is the principle that
equity will make specific a general charitable intent of a settlor, and will, when
an original specific intent becomes impossible or impracticable of fulfillment,
substitute another plan of administration which is believed to approach the original
scheme as closely as possible. It is the theory that equity has the power to mould
the charitable trust to meet emergencies."
15. Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 412 (1882); Richardson v. Mullery, 200 Mass.
247, 86 N. E. 319 (1908).
16. 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 1297: "In Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee
there are decisions or dicta which repudiate the cy pres doctrine, both judicial
and prerogative."
17. Hodge v. Wellman, 191 Iowa 877, 179 N. W. 534 (1920); Lupton v.
Leander Clark College, 194 Iowa 1008, 187 N. W. 496 (1922); Mary Franklin
Home for Aged Women v. Edson, 193 Iowa 567, 187 N. W. 546 (1922).
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In the case under discussion the intent of the testator is clear. Ile wanted
his estate to be used in paving roads, rather than to be given to his relatives.
The court, in handing down its decree, speaks the language of cy pres, and in fact,
carries out the provisions of the will "cy pres comme possible,"-"as near as
possible."' s The court ordered that the executor should confer with the board of
supervisors, while the second codicil directed that he should have full authority
without the board's cooperation. The result of this case could have been better
justified by the court resting its decision on the ground of an exercise of its cy pres
power,' 9 rather than placing it on the ground of an exercise of dependent relative
revocation which was not applied within any orthodox meaning of the term.
Missouri courts now generally recognize the doctrine of cy pres. 20 In the case
of Burnier v. Jones," the court held valid a charitable trust, although the words
of the trust did not name a legatee capable of taking under the Missouri law.
GENE M. UNTERBERGEP.

18. See note 2, stipra.
19. Richardson v. Mullery, 200 Mass. 247, 86 N. E. 3-19 (1908); Gagnon v.
Wellman, 78 N. H. 327, S9 Atl. 786 (1917) ; Note (1919) 19 COL. L. REv. 104.
20. Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414 (1899); Mott v. Morris,
249 Mo. 137, 155 S. W. 434 (1913) ; Catron v. Scarritt Collegiate Institute, 264
Mo. 713, 175 S.W. 571 (1915); Thatcher v. St. Louis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S. W.
(2d) 677 (1934), (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 467.
21. 338 Mo. 679, 92 S. W. (2d) 885 (1936), (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 368, was
an action to construe a will which provided for the payment of the testator's debts
and then devised the residue of his estate to "the Macon County Mo, school funds."
It was contended that this devise was void and could not be construed as creating
a charitable trust because of the failure to designate a legatee capable of taking
under Missouri law, and, therefore, the testator died intestate as to all the property remaining after the payment of his debts. The court held that the trust
was valid, as a court of equity could ascertain and apply the testator's intent to
the objects intended. This case expressly overrules the case of Robinson v.
Crutcher, 277 Mo. 1, 209 S. W. 104 (1919), (1921) 21 U. of Mo. BUL. L. SER. 31.
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